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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A
DILEMMA IN THE SEARCH FOR
JUSTICE
ROBERT J. FLEMMA, M.D.*
Having been invited to write an essay on medical malprac-
tice for the Law Review, I vowed to avoid the opprobrious
conduct currently in vogue with lawyers and physicians. The
search for justice on behalf of injured patients deserves more
than recriminations. It demands our best introspective
thoughts, examining the causes and searching for solutions
that will bring justice for patients, physicians, hospitals, attor-
neys, and society in general.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY
A. From Babylon to London
Throughout history, every civilized society has had medi-
cal healers, under some name or other. In earliest recorded
time, these medical healers were perceived to have a special
relationship with the gods; later, they professed to have some
special knowledge which exceeded that of the lay person. For
that reason the society would grant them special privileges in
performing medical or surgical treatment upon others. Rec-
ognition of the potential for the harm or abuse resulting from
unbridled privilege led to regulation of medicine in every soci-
ety. The Code of Hammurabi from ancient Babylon was the
first codified principle of law. Criminal law was guided by the
principle of lex talionis - the eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth,
concept. Medical practice was included under this principle,
and carelessness and neglect were severely punished as a
clumsy surgeon might lose both hands for a maiming opera-
* B.A., Amherst College, Amherst, Massachusetts, 1956; M.D., University of
Rochester School of Medicine and Dentistry, 1960; Post-Doctoral Education, Duke
University Medical Center, 1960-1967; Clinical Professor of Surgery, Medical College
of Wisconsin. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Robert J. Flemma,
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tion.' The ancient Egyptians had specialists for various parts
of the body, and if they wandered outside their special area of
expertise or varied from the specifically prescribed modes of
treatment, untoward results were punishable by death.
The historians of classical Greek culture have arrived at
the conclusion that there were no legal mechanisms whereby
those injured by a physician, or relatives of a deceased, could
seek legal redress. One historian explained that the ultimate
penalty for a physician was ill repute.2 This remedy was of
little solace to patients and their relatives and confuses today's
legal scholars, because in that society even homicide was the
subject of private suits. There was, however, a theoretical
consideration of malpractice as arising from willfulness, negli-
gence, or ignorance. Plato's thinking on the subject of igno-
rance as a cause of injury by physicians is apropos even today.
He said ignorance falls into two categories: (1) simple igno-
rance causing minor errors; and (2) the double ignorance oc-
curring when the physician is gripped not only by ignorance
but also by a conceit of wisdom for things the physician
knows nothing about.3
The Greeks furnished the great ideas, but the Romans
translated them into practical use. The Romans distinguished
between dolus (evil intent), culpa (including both negligence
and incompetence), and casus (accident). Dolus fell under the
intentional action of willful, intentional harm. Culpa and ca-
sus came under unintentional action.4 The complex ambigui-
ties of these concepts were a source of much legal ink for the
Romans, as it is today. The Romans did recognize that there
might be potential for harm without evil intent and estab-
lished specific, albeit limited, provisions for seeking redress
against the negligent or incompetent physician.
During the period 400 A.D. to 1300 A.D., the admixture
of religion and medicine created the sense that disease was
1. See Reed, Understanding Tort Law: The Historic Basis of Medical Legal Liabil-
ity, J. LEGAL MED., Oct. 1977, at 51.
2. See Amundsen, The Liability of the Physician in Classical Greek Legal Theory
and Practice, J. HIST. MED., Apr. 1977, at 172, in which the author quoted from the
text in translation of an anonymous treatise in the Hippocratic Corpus entitled Law.
3. See Amundsen, supra note 2, at 175. It is interesting that both Plato and Aris-




punishment for evil. Since there was virtually no rational
medical treatment in this period, death and injury were con-
sidered the will of God and not to be questioned. This was a
poor time for physicians and lawyers, as well as patients.
In fourteenth century England malpractice was closely in-
terwoven with the theory of contract.5 Physicians were com-
monly retained for set fees to provide care to wealthy
personages or monastic groups, and suits arose when a physi-
cian would not travel to advise and examine them6 or when a
patient would stop paying the retainer fee.7
In England, the first classical malpractice case was re-
corded in 1375.8 Although the surgeon was acquitted on a
technicality, the judge stated that the surgeon indeed would
have been liable for negligent treatment of a wound. By 1435
a second medical opinion was compulsory in London for
"critical" cases.9 Master surgeons and physicians were ap-
pointed by the mayor to conduct peer review of their profes-
sion and to be available for consultation prior to the treatment
of these cases. They were also called to testify in recorded
malpractice suits. Some surgeons began taking out malprac-
tice "floater" policies on individual patients prior to treatment
that might lead to death, serious injury, or accusations of
malpractice. 10
5. For a discussion of the relationship between the medieval medical practitioner
and early vestiges of the common law, see generally Post, Doctor Versus Patient: Two
Fourteenth-Century Lawsuits, MED. HIsT., July 1972, at 296-300.
6. Having been paid, the physicians would not make house calls.
7. These cases presage current health maintenance organizations (HMO) contracts
by 600 years.
8. This case has been identified as Stratton v. Swanlond, Y.B. 48 Edw. 3, f. 6, pl. 11
(1375). See generally Chapman, Stratton v. Swanlond: The Fourteenth Century Ances-
tor of the Law of Malpractice, PHAROS, Fall 1982, at 20-24.
9. Cosman, The Medieval Medical Third Party: Compulsory Consultation and Mal-
practice Insurance, ANNALS OF PLASTIC SURGERY, Feb. 1982, at 155-58. Of particular
interest is the author's discussion of a London ordinance in 1423 which required that a
physician treating a critically ill patient consult a "master surgeon" on the case within
three days of diagnosis. See id. at 157-58.
10. See id. at 161.
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B. In the United States
The oldest recorded American medical malpractice litiga-
tion occurred in 1794 in Connecticut." There were twenty-
seven malpractice suits in the United States between 1794 and
1861 that were adjudicated as appeals in various state supreme
courts and thus available for review.12 Two-thirds of these
suits involved injuries relating to orthopedic problems: frac-
tures, amputations, and dislocations. Five involved obstetrics.
This review is interesting because the malpractice suits then as
now are a reflection of the predominant surgical practice of
the time.
The concept of medical negligence began to evolve from
the unintentional tort of negligence in this period. Courts up-
graded physician responsibility for the care of their patients
and expected doctors to practice up-to-date medicine. Physi-
cians were alarmed at the increase in malpractice claims, and
it is believed that some practitioners stopped their surgical
practice because of the threat of malpractice.1 3
With the introduction of anesthesia in 1846, the practice of
surgery expanded to operations within the abdominal cavity
and was no longer primarily orthopedic and superficial-infec-
tion therapy. Over the next forty to eighty years, operations
became standardized with predictable mortality and morbid-
ity. By the 1920s hospitals began to provide more sophisti-
cated laboratory equipment to analyze blood and urine, as
science crept unobtrusively into patient care. In the latter half
of the nineteenth century, malpractice claims continued, but
11. See Reed, supra note 1, at 53 (discussing Cross v. Guthrie, 2 Root 90 (Conn.
1794)). In Cross, a husband sued a physician for the death of his wife who was undergo-
ing a mastectomy. He alleged unskillful, ignorant, and cruel treatment.
12. See Bums, Malpractice Suits in American Medicine Before the Civil War, BULL.
HisT. MED., Jan.-Feb. 1969, at 42. One of the suits originated in a Racine, Wisconsin
circuit court in 1853. See id. at 43-44 (citing Reynolds v. Graves, 3 Wis. 371 (1854)).
During this period, Abraham Lincoln had been a defendant's attorney in a malprac-
tice suit. See Letter from Clark Heath to editor, NEw ENG. J. MED., Sept. 23, 1976, at
735-36. The letter refers to a quote attributed to Lincoln in defense of the accused
surgeons: "Mr. Fleming, instead of bringing suit against these surgeons for not giving
your bone proper attention, you should go on your knees and thank God and them that
you have your leg." Id. at 736.
13. See generally J. ELWELL, A MEDICO-LEGAL TREATISE ON MALPRACTICE
AND MEDICAL EVIDENCE, COMPRISING THE ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL JURISPRU-
DENCE (1860). Elwell published the first systematic review of American malpractice
claims and recognized that they had become a part of American medicine.
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the numbers are difficult to ascertain. What was evolving le-
gally was the elevation of standards set by the courts. 14 Physi-
cians were originally held to the standards of their type of
medicine, that is, homeopathy, allopathy, and the like. But as
medicine became more scientific, all practitioners were held to
certain minimal local standards. Pike v. Honsinger,'5 an 1898
case in the New York Court of Appeals, stated the principles
that with some modification provided standards and prece-
dent for cases since then. Over the years, there was a change
from local standards of care to national standards of care.
Between 1935 and 1955, there were 605 malpractice cases
in the United States, an average of thirty-one cases per year.16
In this period, California was the leader with almost seventeen
percent of all the cases, followed by New York, Washington,
Ohio, and North Carolina.1 7 Fifty percent of cases were from
eight states.' 8 Between 1945 and 1949, the fewest number of
cases occurred, and the largest judgment was $115,000.11
This was the calm before the storm.
The advent of antibiotics in the 1940s and the scientific
technological revolution left no area of the body unexplored,
surgically or medically. Truly for the first time in the history
of medicine, physicians had a greater chance of helping pa-
tients, rather than hurting them, with treatment. The science
of medicine exploded, as laboratory tests and x-rays increased
diagnostic ability and added greater accuracy and quantifica-
tion of disease states. Physicians became more accountable
for what they did, and their interpretation was more easily
questioned by attorneys who could also review the same objec-
tive data and assess the physician's interpretation of results.
The number of claims continued to rise, and by the 1970s phy-
sicians perceived the increase in the number and the size of
claims as a threat that instigated job actions, strikes, and sit
downs. It was called a crisis. However, a crisis can be a truly
14. See generally Weigel, Medical Malpractice in America's Middle Years, TEX.
REP. BIOLOGY MED., Spring 1974, at 191-205.
15. 155 N.Y. 201, 49 N.E. 760 (1898).
16. See Stetler, The History of Reported Medical Professional Liability Cases, 30
TEMP. L.Q. 366, 367 (1957).
17. See id. at 368.
18. See id. at 369.
19. See id. at 381.
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marvelous mechanism for the withdrawal or suspension of es-
tablished rights and the acquisition and legitimization of new
privileges. Indeed, there was a problem, as hospital malprac-
tice premiums by 1976 were $1.2 billion per year, up from $61
million in 1960.2 Physicians' premiums were skyrocketing,
the number of claims was continually increasing, and this en-
vironment led to a "siege mentality." By 1975, the primary
concern was the unavailability of liability insurance.
In 1973, the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare's Malpractice Commission strongly recommended pre-
trial screening panels as the primary method for speeding
resolution of medical liability claims and eliminating nonmeri-
torious suits. 21 Many states reacted with legislation in about
1975. In Wisconsin, the legislature, in an attempt to get jus-
tice for physicians, patients, providers, and attorneys, set up
the Patient's Compensation Panel and the Patient's Compen-
sation Fund. The intent was to require that allegations of
medical malpractice against a Wisconsin health care provider
be heard by a panel prior to the filing of a circuit court ac-
tion. 2 The Patient's Compensation Fund was created for the
purpose of paying the portion of the settlement or award
against the health care provider in excess of the insurance cov-
erage required to be procured privately by all health care
providers - $200,000 per claim and $600,000 in aggregate
claims per year. 3 Has the panel system been helpful to all or
has it been solely for the protection of providers - physicians
and hospitals?
II. THE PROBLEM
From July 1, 1975 to June 30, 1984 a total of 2,012 mal-
practice claims were filed with the compensation panel in Wis-
20. See T. LOMBARDI, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: A LEGISLATOR'S
VIEW (1978). The author relied upon data presented in an interview of James L.
Groves of the American Hospital Association before the New York State Senate Health
Committee Staff on May 9, 1977.
21. See SECRETARY'S COMMISSION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE REPORT ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DHEW Pub. No. (05), at 73-78
(1973).
22. See DIRECTOR OF STATE COURTS OFFICE, A STATUS REPORT ON THE PA-
TIENT'S COMPENSATION PANEL SYSTEM IN WISCONSIN: 1976-1981, June 1982, at I.
23. This fund is paid for by the providers' contributions.
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consin, more than fifty percent in the last three years.24
Obviously, the incidence of claims has risen precipitously.
Malpractice premiums for providers dropped initially, then
rose dramatically as the frequency of claims and the size of
awards and settlements grew.
Not only has this affected physicians, but these costs were
passed on to patients leading to higher health care costs for
every citizen of Wisconsin.25 Today, professional liability in-
surance adds about $3 to the cost of a visit to a physician, $5
per day to the average hospital bill, and up to $300 to the cost
of some births.26 In Wisconsin, medical liability premiums to-
taled $27.9 million, and it is estimated that the accompanying
defensive medicine - ordering all possible laboratory and x-
ray tests in fear of reprisal - adds approximately $240 mil-
lion to the Wisconsin health care bill.27
In this climate, malpractice attorneys are crying for the
abolition of the compensation panel citing four main rea-
sons.2 They claim that the panel system: (1) causes unneces-
sary delay in final disposition of a claim; (2) is biased because
there are two physicians, one attorney, and two lay persons on
a formal panel; (3) produces findings which have a "chilling
effect" on any circuit court trial; and (4) protects repeat of-
fender physicians about whom nothing is done. Let us now
examine these arguments carefully.
24. See WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL STAFF, DATA RELATING TO MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTICE, Informational Memorandum 84-25, Aug. 7, 1984, at 3 [hereinafter
cited as LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL].
Wisconsin Compensation Panel Experience
Claims Filed Claims Paid Average Paid/Claim
1978 145 4 $138,064
1980 262 10 $203,353
1982 413 18 $238,022
1983 376 25 $426,672
1984 451 (projected) -
STATE MEDICAL SOCIETY OF WISCONSIN, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, Sept. 4, 1984, at 3 [hereinafter
cited as SMS REPORT]. SMS information was obtained from the Patient's Compensa-
tion Fund.
25. Certain groups, such as obstetricians, have even changed or ceased their prac-
tice. See infra text accompanying note 43.
26. See STATE MEDICAL SOCIETY OF WISCONSIN, STATEMENT TO LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL MALPRATICE, Sept. 4, 1984, at 1.
27. See id. at 2.
28. See, e.g., The Medical Malpractice War, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 27, 1984, at 1.
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Does the panel system cause unnecessary delays? The
facts say no. Panel cases disposed of before a hearing have a
median age of 362 days, while similar cases in circuit court
require 532 days. 29 The median age of panel cases resolved
through the hearing process is 391 days, while circuit court
trials last 655 days.30 Once opened, a case is usually resolved
within one year. For informal panels reviewing smaller
claims, eighty-five percent are settled in less than one year.
For formal panels reviewing larger claims, sixty-four percent
are disposed of in less than one year and an additional twenty-
two percent are disposed of in less than one and one-half
years. Before the panel system was instituted in 1975, it took
an average of two years for a Wisconsin claim to be resolved;
now it has been cut to less than one year.3'
Indeed, any delays are due to lawyers and Wisconsin's
three year statute of limitations. Indiana and Wisconsin have
the same incidence of malpractice claims, yet Indiana attor-
neys get matters on file one year sooner because they have a
two year statute of limitations. 2 And when a one year statute
of limitations existed in Ohio, the claims also were filed on
time.
Thus, the lawyer's argument does not withstand scrutiny,
as indeed the panel system has effectively decreased the time
to resolution for patients. The system has not been perfect,
but with 1,152 claims filed in the last three years, the panel
system was physically unable to meet its original goals. It is
to the panel system's credit that it still resolves claims sooner
than before its existence.
Is the panel system biased? Of the 1,512 closed claims,
case disposition has been evenly divided between claimants
and physicians. Fifty-six percent of all claimants received
some compensation through the panel system, as either pre-
hearing settlements or panel awards.3 3 In fact, claimants in
Wisconsin are more likely to be compensated than claimants
29. See SMS REPORT, supra note 24, at 21 (figures exclude Milwaukee County).
30. See id. (figures exclude Milwaukee County).
31. See MEDICAL PROTECTIVE COMPANY, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN WISCON-
SIN, Sept. 4, 1984, at 4 (presented to the Wisconsin Legislative Council).
32. See id. at 4-5.
33. See PHYSICIAN'S ALLIANCE, STATE MEDICAL SOCIETY OF WISCONSIN, 1985-
1986 LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 10 (1984).
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in other states.34 Nationally, in the years 1975 to 1978, claim-
ants prevailed in jury trials fourteen percent of the time, while
in Wisconsin panel hearings, claimants won thirty-one percent
of the cases.35 These data hardly support the bias claim.
Claimants in Wisconsin utilizing the panel system are twice as
successful as plaintiffs in jury trials.
Does the panel system produce a "chilling effect"? In the
establishment of the panel system, the legislature allowed the
findings of formal panels to be admitted in a subsequent cir-
cuit court trial. Lawyers feel this admission has a "chilling
effect" on later trials.
In Wisconsin between 1975 and 1981, a review of ninety-
five panel findings that were in favor of the physician revealed
that twenty-three were ultimately settled with payment to the
claimant.36 Thus twenty-five percent of physician panel victo-
ries were ultimately settled with payment to the claimant
when the insurance companies ignored the panel findings.
When one remembers that Wisconsin panel verdicts are in
favor of claimants more than twice as often as national court
verdicts, providers have a greater right to concern than plain-
tiffs and their lawyers. And since less than ten percent of the
panel cases were carried to a jury trial, it is difficult to find
much merit in the "chilling effect" claim.37
Finally, are there many "repeat offenders" who are not
disciplined? The answer is of great concern for physicians,
who would be subsidizing these repeat offenders through pre-
mium payments to insurance companies and the panel system.
There is no financial or professional incentive to protect repeat
offenders. Medical malpractice falls under the broad category
of unprofessional conduct. This is a problem because while
conduct may be unprofessional it does not necessarily consti-
tute medical malpractice. The way the system works is that
complaints to the Medical Examining Board are investigated
by an attorney; the board then prioritizes the complaints and
decides the course of action. The board may receive allega-
34. See SMS REPORT, supra note 24, at 22 (citing study by the National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners).
35. See id. at 23.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 22.
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tions from: (1) the Department of Justice (Medicare fraud);
(2) the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration (prescrip-
tions); (3) Department of Health and Social Services (nursing
homes); or (4) other physicians, pharmacies, and nurses. Only
hospitals and the Patient's Compensation Panel are required
to report to the Medical Examining Board. The compensa-
tion panel must report negligent providers to the board. A
hospital must report the name of any staff member who loses
hospital privileges for more than 30 days or resigns from the
staff for 30 days or more. However, Wisconsin does not re-
quire the reporting of malpractice claims settled without panel
awards. For example, from 1975 to 1980, 700 cases filed with
panels were settled prior to a panel hearing;38 thus no reports
were issued to the Medical Examining Board. Further com-
plicating the issue is the fact that insurance companies may
settle a claim without the provider's approval since the settle-
ment may be less than the anticipated expenses of preparing
for a panel hearing. If providers and insurance companies
fought all claims, there would be legal delays, a backlog of
cases, and increased insurance premiums. These settlements
indeed may allow a repeat offender to obfuscate the problem.
A fair solution to this has been proposed by the Medical
Society: make all claims settled over $25,000 result in a report
to the examining board.39 This solution would not cause great
paperwork for insurance companies. With computer technol-
ogy, records could be easily kept, and paid claims could be
categorized when reported to the board. They could distin-
guish between cases in which negligence appears to have oc-
curred and those in which the issue of negligence was
doubtful, but it was financially expedient to settle.
The Medical Examining Board's division of enforcement
has less than five full-time investigators and only two attor-
neys assigned to work with them. This staff must be increased
if one expects two attorneys to review the over 400 claims filed
each year. In this way, repeat offenders could be better identi-
fied, investigated, and disciplined. The board currently has
difficulty even identifying the problem, much less dealing with
it; in this area, the Medical Society and trial lawyers are in
38. See LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 24, at 3.
39. See SMS REPORT, supra note 24, at 9.
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agreement. This does not, however, detract from the panel
system's merits.
The Wisconsin Medical Society does have two recommen-
dations that bear on this subject. First, it advocates that the
Medical Examining Board contract with the Wisconsin Medi-
cal Society to investigate and review data on offenders.' The
Medical Society already does this with Medicaid offenders,
and there is a great financial incentive for all providers to
identify offenders who repeatedly increase every physician's
premiums. There would be no incentive for physicians to
cover up, ignore, or subsidize substandard care of patients.
And second, the Wisconsin Medical Society has also sup-
ported an increase in license fees if that increased revenue
would be specifically allocated to pay trained board investiga-
tors. This proposal has been offered in two budget bills with-
out being acted upon. The Medical Society has recognized the
problem and has proposed some solutions but to little avail.
Although the panel system should not be abolished for the
reasons cited by malpractice attorneys, it may still be im-
proved. One improvement would be to utilize, on a rotating
basis, retired or reserve judges and a retired physician. They
would sit on panels involving the larger claims or those of re-
peat offenders, and their prestige would lend more authority
to their findings. And to obviate any claim of conflict of inter-
est, they should be paid by the state.
III. PATIENT CARE STANDARDS
It would be impossible to deal with all the implications of
the present malpractice problem, but there are two scenarios
that adversely affect patients, physicians, hospitals, and attor-
neys. Most reviews allude to a diminution of patient care
standards, but do not demonstrate how this will occur. The
following two scenarios provide some insight into the evolu-
tion of the bigger problem.
A. The Ob-Gyn Scenario
The practice of obstetrician-gynecologists (Ob-Gyn's) is
going to be the first area of patient care adversely affected.
40. See id. at 8-9.
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Throughout the country, sixty-six percent of Ob-Gyn's have
been sued.41 The frequency of claims has tripled since 1976,
with the rate growing ten percent per year.4 2 In Wisconsin,
the current premiums for Ob-Gyn's are $18,600. There is in
1985 an anticipated rise of seventy-five percent on the current
basic premium of $8,600 and a two hundred and fifty percent
rise on the Patient's Compensation Fund premium of $10,000.
If this occurs, the 1985 premium will rise to $15,000 for pri-
mary coverage and $25,000 for the fund premium for an esti:
mated total of $40,000.
This malpractice insurance premium will have certain im-
mediate effects on physician fees. Established Ob-Gyn's will
pass these costs on to all young parents and those requiring
gynecologic surgery. The fear of suits will again raise the cost
of defensive medicine. Although this fear is felt to be exagger-
ated by many, one example may suffice. Neural-tube defects
can be detected intra-utero by an expensive, somewhat risky,
test that will have to be performed on all women despite the
fact that these defects occur in only one in 1,000 newborns.
Since Ob-Gyn's are being held liable if they do not suggest this
test to an expectant mother, despite the low incidence of this
defect, and allow her the choice of abortion, they will be
forced to perform a multitude of tests not routinely done. The
Ob-Gyn's cannot guarantee a perfect baby for all. This situa-
tion is unfair, impractical, and impossible, but it creates a
specter in the Ob-Gyn's psyche that is not unreasonable.
In the long-term, Ob-Gyn's will drop out of obstetric prac-
tice, leaving lesser-trained physicians and midwives to per-
form almost all deliveries. Eighteen percent of Ob-Gyn's in
Wisconsin have stopped accepting high-risk patients, such as
diabetics, hypertensives, and women over thirty-five.43 It is all
well and good to say that they will be referred to high-risk
units in university centers, but babies are not predictable; hav-
ing to travel long distances will lead to more unattended deliv-
eries. This risk carries an increased maternal mortality rate,
and the inaccessibility of this service is going to lead to a
41. Address by Elvoy Raines, Management of Liability - Attracting Incidents, to
the Seminar on Gynecologic Surgery, St. Thomas, V.I., Feb. 16-19, 1984, at 1.
42. Id.
43. See SMS REPORT, supra note 24, at 6.
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greater maldistribution of medical resources. Fewer new phy-
sicians will be able to afford the insurance to start practice,
and within ten years there will be fewer Ob-Gyn's available
throughout the state. This will adversely affect the children
and grandchildren of every person in Wisconsin.
B. Federal Scenario
Standards, rules, and regulations have usually been the do-
main of the individual states. However, as total health care
costs have escalated, the federal government has been seeking
ways to contain costs. The greatest concern is that looking at
medical care through a financial tunnel may lead to health
care as a commodity provided by the government at the low-
est cost and not as a commitment to excellent care for all.
The establishment of DRG's is the first step, already in
effect. A DRG is a form of reimbursement to hospitals by
disease related groups. Diseases are categorized, and a pre-
scribed number of hospital days are reimbursed for each cate-
gory. It is hoped that this may work to eliminate inefficient
practice patterns and thus save money. Economist Patricia
Danzon feels that for DRG's to work "they must not be held
to the customary norms of traditional fee-for-service
medicine."'  This willingness to subvert medical standards
for economic purposes is frightening.
Danzon and Duke Law Professor Clark Havighurst raise
the DRG question in relation to the standards required of
health maintenance organizations (HMO's). An HMO con-
tracts with a group of people to provide for all health care
needs for a set cost per year. It theoretically provides incen-
tives to physicians to keep patients out of hospitals and thus
lowers health care costs. They further suggest that an HMO
might contract to be bound not by a community standard of
care, but by the standard of other HMO's in the country.
Federal programs such as Medicare might also set up their
own standards of care that would be based on economic con-
siderations. Private insurers may offer a third more expensive
plan and higher standards would be expected. It is conceiva-
ble that there could be two, three, or more standards of medi-
44. See The Medical Malpractice War, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 27, 1984, at 12 (testimony
before Congress in July 1984).
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cal care based on the third party payor. Would economic
restraint be translated into a different legal and medical stan-
dard of care? Havighurst casually said, "Only trial lawyers
would have reason for complaint."45 This is not true. The
patients would have every reason to complain as would con-
cerned physicians. The obvious answer to a multi-level stan-
dard of medical care has already been articulated: everyone
would be subject to the federal standard which would be pred-
icated on economics and politics, leading to the lowest com-
mon denominator being the standard. The federal
government would have control of medical care and stan-
dards. However, there is little history that suggests it would
function better than the post office or any other federal
agency.
IV. MEDICAL SOCIETY PROPOSALS
The most critical area of change must be the expense of
malpractice insurance, since premiums have increased the cost
of health care and limited the availability of certain medical
services.46 The Wisconsin Medical Society has made several
proposals designed to control this expense. First, raise the
threshold to the Patient's Compensation Fund. Increasing the
threshold (to $500,000 per claim, for example) would reduce
the fund's liability, reduce duplication of efforts by primary
carriers and the fund, and provide a stronger incentive for pri-
mary carriers to perform adequate loss prevention, claims
management, and legal services. The original concept was
that the fund would function as a catastrophic loss pool.
However, from 1979 to 1983 the average dollar amount of
claims paid by the fund has substantially exceeded this figure.
In 1983, for example, 25 claims were paid at an average of
$426,672 per claim.47 It is obvious that awards greater than
$200,000 have become the rule rather than the exception. The
fund is threatened with insolvency, and this proposal would be
a step toward the financial security of the fund.
Second, limit fund liability. Purchasing reinsurance could
limit the amount the fund would pay on any given claim in a
45. See id.
46. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
47. See SMS REPORT, supra note 24, at 3.
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given year, and a statutory limit of $1,000,000 per claim as a
fund responsibility would also limit liability.48 This is in no
way a limit on recovery or a cap on awards but simply a limit
on the fund's liability. Physicians with need of more coverage
than their primary insurance plus $1,000,000 in fund coverage
could obtain it from the private market.
Third, structure payment of all fund awards. Currently
awards in excess of $1,000,000 are paid in installments of
$50,000 per year. This concept could, for example, be broad-
ened so that all fund awards could be paid at $200,000 per
year. Also, periodic payment of future damages - such as
future medical expenses, modifications to residences, and
purchase of specialized equipment - as incurred rather than
as lump-sum payments would improve the management of
fund assets.
Fourth, prohibit duplication of benefits and reduce awards
by the amount available from collateral sources such as health
and disability insurance, worker's compensation, and social
security. The Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice
reported that a mandatory collateral offset is extremely effec-
tive in reducing the size of excessive jury verdicts and
settlements.49
Fifth, limit awards for non-economic damages such as
pain and suffering. Limits of $100,000, $200,000, and
$500,000 have been suggested in other states. Data compiled
from reports in the Wisconsin Law Reporter showed that non-
economic awards exceeded economic awards.5 0 Pain and suf-
fering, being subjective emotions, can lend themselves to ma-
nipulation not only because of the jury's subjective assessment
(sympathy) but also because of the attorney's skill and the
claimant's appearance and demeanor. These factors have led
to wide fluctuations in awards for the same type of injury.
Sixth, bifurcate the trial. Separate hearings on the liability
and damage issues should be held. If liability is determined in
48. St. Paul Fire & Marine Company stated that seventy-five percent of its insured
physicians have policies with a limit of one million dollars. See id. at 12.
49. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY AND INSURANCE, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE 80's, Nov. 1984, at 15.
50. See SMS REPORT, supra note 24, at 11. Information compiled from the Wis-
consin Law Reporter between January 1, 1982 and June 23, 1984 indicated non-eco-
nomic awards of $6,357,490 and economic awards of $5,143,110.
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the first hearing stage, the parties proceed with a hearing on
damages. Plaintiffs' attorney Timothy Aiken stated that this
proposal "makes sense. . . and would cut panel time at least
in half."5 1
Seventh, restrict appeals of panel decisions. Measures
must be taken to dissuade claimants who lose at the panel
level from appealing cases to the circuit courts. Requiring the
posting of bonds that are sufficient to cover the other party's
legal costs has been suggested in other states. These are but a
small percent of cases that are heard and should not be a great
burden on over ninety percent of cases. The predominant rea-
son for panel case dismissal is absence of merit or lack of pros-
ecution. 2 From 1978 through 1981, eleven percent of all
cases were dismissed. 3 This increased to thirty-one percent
dismissals in all cases for 1983.54 While not resulting in pay-
ment, congestion of the panel system delays resolution of mer-
itorious claims and is expensive for the panel administrators
and insurance carriers.
Eighth, implement loss prevention measures. State-wide
data on claims must be gathered so that abuses of claims can
be analyzed and prevention measures focused appropriately.
This data should be reviewed by a physician committee for
loss prevention and peer review purposes.
Ninth, sanction "repeat" offenders. If peer review indi-
cated multiple cases of negligence by a particular physician,
sanctions such as surcharges, restricted coverage, or referral
to the Medical Examining Board would be imposed.
Tenth, tighten the statute of limitations. Current statutes
allow three years from the incident or one year from discovery
of the injury, but never later than five years from the incident
for adults; minors are bound by the adult statute or age ten,
whichever is later. The American Medical Association has
developed a model bill which allows two years from the inci-
dent or two years from discovery, but never more than four
51. See WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 4, 1984, at 11.





years from the incident for adults and the adult statute or age
ten, whichever is later, for minors.
Finally, limit attorney contingency fees. Several states
have proposed sliding scales - for example, limit attorney
fees to thirty-three percent of awards of up to $100,000,
twenty-five percent of awards between $100,000 and $200,000,
twenty percent of awards between $200,000 and $300,000,
and fifteen percent of awards in excess of $300,000. This con-
cept, which has been adopted by several states, ideally should
be carried out by attorneys and not by state law. A group of
reasonable attorneys who are most involved could set better
guidelines. However, some prompt considerations of this sub-
ject by attorneys would be advisable. The federal government,
as insurer of one-third of the population through federal pro-
grams, and the state see this limitation solely as a cost con-
tainment measure and not necessarily from an attorney's point
of view. However, there is recognition of the fact that limiting
the contingency fee may spur attorneys to seek higher dam-
ages than they would under the current system, and the move
could well be counter-productive.
V. PHYSICIANS AND PATIENTS & LAWYERS AND CLIENTS
The barely comprehensible complexities of the malpractice
problem have perversely led to oversimplification, suggesting
it is just lawyers versus physicians. Unmentioned, but faintly
recognized, are the facts that the patient is the victim and that
society in general is affected through the malpractice prob-
lem's effect on the quality and availability of the modern ad-
vances of medicine. Thoughtful legislators recognize there is
a problem, but the media's role in publicizing hostility and
recriminations between physicians and lawyers has made it
appear that legislators must choose sides. We all have to help
solve the problem for the patient's sake. Physicians and law-
yers have to see the relationship of their work to the whole
fabric of culture and society. In doing this, we may elucidate
rather than castigate, but it does require more introspection
on all sides.
Dr. James Todd, while President of the Physician's Insur-
ance Association of America, said "efforts directed toward
tort reform and legislative relief must be reasonable and not
self-serving. Malpractice is a medical problem not a legal one,
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and those injured as a result of negligence are entitled to fair
and prompt compensation." Agreement with that point of
view is shared by the vast preponderance of physicians. How-
ever, honest and competent physicians have the right to be
free from spurious and frivolous claims that adversely affect
their ability to care for patients. In the remainder of this es-
say, I would like to share personal introspections, from a phy-
sician's point of view, on the relationship of the physician to
the patient, society, and attorneys as brought to light by the
medical malpractice problem.
The patient, often neglected in this controversy, deserves
some clearer definition. Pellegrino has pointed out that the
word "patient" is derived from the Latin patior which means
"to suffer" or "bear something."55 It does not mean long-suf-
fering. People become patients when they recognize that they
lack the knowledge or skill to deal with illness. Their ability
to function as "whole" persons is compromised, and they seek
help from one who professes special skills and knowledge to
deal with that loss of wholeness which is a disease state. It is
an unequal relationship. Patients, by presenting themselves,
acknowledge that they need help from someone who has more
powerful tools and knowledge. This inequality is indeed rec-
ognized by patients as a diminution of their person, their ego,
and their self-esteem, as well as a purely physicial diminution.
Patients are confronted with their own mortality, perhaps for
the first time, and are no longer in control.
Patients present a problem because they have sought out
the physician who professes to know how to help. Faith and
confidence in that physician are an important prerequisite for
healing to occur. Patients do not want to hear negatives or
limitations. They want to be made whole and, because it
works so often generally, expect that it will be just as easy
individually. Medicine has been presented as "a miracle an
hour with a few minutes out for commercials" - the Marcus
Welby syndrome. This unequal relationship imposes great re-
sponsibility upon the physician who has professed to be skilled
and knowledgeable with a commitment of those skills and
knowledge to the benefit of others.
55. E. PELLEGRINO, HUMANISM AND THE PHYSICIAN 225 (1979).
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The word profession comes from the Latin verb profitero
which means to make a public avowal or proclamation. While
its earliest use was associated with vows to join a religious
order, it later became a declaration of possession of skills and
knowledge to be placed in the service of others. It is equally
applicable to law and ministry. It has been bastardized today
to mean a prestigious occupation; however, to return it to the
older more meaningful level we must have "commitment,"
which means one places one's service to others above one's
own self. This is a difficult goal to strive for. If not always
attained, it should be assiduously sought after as often as pos-
sible because the inequality between physician and patient is a
potential source of patient resentment when profession of
skills and knowledge are not manifest, or are performed
carelessly.
In all efforts to explain the marked increase in malpractice
claims nationally and locally, there are the usual stock an-
swers depending on whether one talks with physicians, law-
yers, patients, or legislators. I will not reiterate all of the
reasons, but will try to reason from the definitions above to
understand the motivation for the litigious avalanche.
I state categorically that the increase in claims does not
represent a decrease in the quality of medicine locally or na-
tionally. In both Wisconsin and the nation, medical practice
is the highest quality in the world. Why, then, the paradox of
increasing claims, and yet better medicine?
Let us reexamine malpractice under the three groupings
identified by the Romans because they are still apropos.
There is dolus, the use of medicine with evil intent and treach-
ery. This conduct is a rare complaint and, when present, is
dealt with by criminal law. Then there is culpa, which in-
cludes negligence and incompetence, and casus, which is acci-
dental conduct. These two come under unintentional action,
or now, action that results in a tort.
Definition is easy, but discerning the difference is much
more ambiguous. The ambiguities result from the fact that
medicine, despite fantastic progress, is not an exact science.
Untoward or adverse results of medical treatment may occur
without negligence or accident. Every proposed treatment or
operation has certain negative side effects, an established inci-
dence of complications and failures that occur regardless of
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how skillfully the treatment or operation is performed. It is
the physicians' perception that lawyers do not understand this
point and feel that negligence is behind every complication,
side effect, or failure of therapy. It is all too easy for physi-
cians to ascribe a lawyer's eagerness to sue for self-serving mo-
tives largely because of the contingency fee. While we realize
that the contingency fee is the "key to the courthouse," we
resent that as a result of the contingency fee the lawyer be-
comes a proprietor and partner in the suit. Lawyers have not
diminished this perception by their media advertisements and
portrayals of a "million dollar club." Physicians perceive this
not as a pursuit of justice for the injured patient but as a tech-
nique that stimulates every patient to seek fortune through the
malpractice suit.
The rise in the number of malpractice claims is not solely a
creation of the lawyers' ingenious advertising. Medicine itself
has contributed to the problem: as the scientific aspects of
medicine exploded, the physician became identified as a medi-
cal scientist. Mastery of scientific knowledge and technology
lead to many physicians apotheosizing themselves and their
profession. This unfortunately is a double-edged sword. Lost
was the humility of imprecise knowledge, and acquired was
the hubris of technology. Physicians had been seduced into
thinking that mastery of science and technology made them
masters of the patient. Neo-Cartesian reductionism led
medicine to believe that human beings are an electron transfer
system gone awry, that can be righted by science if only well
enough understood. Specialization and the acquisition of
highly specialized knowledge was the logical aftermath of the
scientific, technological breakthroughs depicted as daily
events to the public by improved media communication sys-
tems. In the course of these technological successes, personal
and hospital aggrandizement were not trivial events.
Lost in the hubris of the moment was the fact that physi-
cians are unable to confer immortality. The patients, who by
definition are not whole, were having expectations heightened,
and specialization led to patients being treated skillfully for
their individual parts. Specialist physicians became "part"
doctors, and lost was the physician who could see patients as
more complicated than the sum of the parts. Impersonality,
inherent in specialization of medical care, while successful for
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many isolated problems, does not react well anymore to the
majority of illnesses since illness does not usually occur in a
vacuum. The whole of a person provides the setting in which
illness occurs. The complete physician has to understand as
much as possible about a whole patient to help the entire pa-
tient be made whole. There is a dichotomy between the true
benefits of reductionist specialization and the needs of a whole
patient.
This dichotomy can only be addressed when knowledge
and skills provide physicians with an understanding of their
limitations. The patients also must be made aware of
medicine's limitations and not just its successes. Even the
benefits of a simple aspirin must be weighed against its poten-
tial, but significant, harmful side effects. Surgeons must real-
ize that the feasibility of an operation is not necessarily an
indication for its performance. Physicians must differentiate
between what a treatment does to a patient and what it does
for a patient.
The physician's knowledge of beneficial and adverse effects
of a treatment must be presented to the patient and be conso-
nant with the patient's expectations from that treatment. The
definition of consent is "to feel together" and "to feel with."
Put in the context of physician hubris and unrealistic patient
expectations, untoward, unexpected results lead to patient an-
ger from unfulfilled expectations. This leads a disappointed
patient to seek an attorney, turning the patient into a client.
Patients have been converted to clients by both profes-
sions. Physicians have been deficient in dealing with the
whole patient and not recognizing and explaining the risks
and limitations of therapy. By not understanding that
medicine is not an exact science, lawyers seek to redress every
untoward event by a lawsuit, even when no negligence is in-
volved. I am not discussing motivation for claims when there
has been negligent action, but those instances in which unto-
ward results have occurred that could have been anticipated
in a certain percentage of patients. Physicians cannot be held
to be guarantors of cure, nor should they present themselves
as such.
The big problem lies not in the cost of liability insurance
but in the consequences of the adversarial quality that rela-
tionships between physicians and lawyers have assumed. So-
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ciety will protect itself from this destructive attitude. If
confronted with no other choice, the federal government will
intrude with cost containment measures that will lead to a
lower quality of care for everyone. Before this occurs, both
professions have to rid themselves of their entrepreneurial
members who denigrate their respective professions. The time
for self-serving rhetoric is past. For all parties concerned,
come let us reason together for justice.
